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[…] pour que le réveil ne soit pas une ruse
du rêve. C’est-à-dire encore de la raison.1
“J e rêve. Je somnambule,” says JacquesDerrida as he accepts the Adorno Prize
in Frankfurt on 22 September 2001 (Fichus
22). It is a striking phrase, this “I am sleepwalk-
ing,” but also one that strikes an idiomatically
Derridean note. The verb “somnambuler” (a
neologism: it does not appear in Littré), conju-
gated in the first-person present tense, entails a
“je somnambule” or “sleepwalking I”; an “I”
that can, with undecidable lucidity, proclaim
its own sleep, in its sleep. It seems a classic Der-
ridean strategy for troubling the sovereignty of
the philosophical “je suis” and the metaphysics
of presence; such that, as Mahité Breton writes,
“categories of responsibility, intention, will and
mastery are destabilised” (207). Indeed, it
might be tempting to see the very concept of
sleepwalking as incipiently deconstructive; as
a topos in which deconstruction is already at
work. Thus, Simon Morgan Wortham, having
shown how sleepwalking marks an excess in
the dialectic of sleep and waking in Kant and
Hegel, sums up: “in the very attempt to
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rationalize sleep […] a certain supplement is
unleashed – call it somnambulance, or some
other name” (Wortham 38). Somnambulance
would thus be a name for a deconstructive
quasi-concept, drawing on a spontaneous pro-
pensity of the informal philospheme “somnam-
bulism” to do the work of deconstruction. It
may seem, thus, that sleepwalking was always
on the side of deconstruction, and that Derri-
da’s “je somnambule” was something decon-
struction had always been ready to utter.
The curious thing, however, is that Derrida’s
own deployment of the lexicon of sleepwalking
does not bear this out; or at least it does not do
so until rather late in the day. Until around
1999, sleepwalking in Derrida was always in
the third person: emphatically the sleepwalking
of the other, it was an accusation, and even a
little polemical. It named the premature cer-
tainty and complacency of method; its assur-
ance that nothing unforeseen by the
programme is worth seeing. Sleepwalking was,
as such, a paradoxical form of vigilance, but
nothing like the deconstructive vigilance that,
as Peggy Kamuf has argued, tends an ear
towards the other, on the lookout for whatever
interrupts the standard-issue vigilance that con-
sists of a “deciphering too certain of meaning”
(12). Far from it, sleepwalking was this compla-
cency in method, this systematic failure to
listen to discrepancy. As such, it was other,
but not that as-yet undetermined other to
which deconstruction must listen carefully for
traces of errancy. It was (and this is the polem-
ical twist) positioned as the other of deconstruc-
tion, to which it could point, and from which it
could mark its distinction with unusual clarity.
Curiously, then, Wortham’s and Breton’s
reading of “somnambulism” is in many ways
more obviously consonant with deconstruction
than Derrida’s own. Neither critic notes the
oddity of this situation, not least because
neither traces the idea of sleepwalking to any
Derridean source, or acknowledges that any
such source might exist. But then, why should
they? After all, sleepwalking is not such an
important figure in Derrida’s writing, and it
seems evidently a mere embellishment of the
language of dream. Breton, indeed, only
discusses the “je somnambule” briefly, in
passing, as a variant on the “je rêve” that
guides her enquiry. And it is quite possible,
and coherent, as the example of Jean-Philippe
Deranty shows, to comment lucidly and percep-
tively on dream and dreaming in Fichus
without mentioning sleepwalking at all. Why,
then, dwell on a tiny rhetorical blip in this
important topic?
A first reason would be that it appears
Derrida himself came to do so. From La
contre-allée (1999), there is a subtle, but deci-
sive, change of direction, or involution, that
continues through late texts such as Genèses,
généalogies, genres et le génie (2003),
Fichus (2001/2002), and the seminars on the
beast and the sovereign (December 2001–
March 2003). There, sleepwalking remains
other, but it is an other that intimately
regards deconstruction; is in some manner
the responsibility of its I; and may even be
assumed in the first person. Although unre-
marked by any explicit gesture of auto-cri-
tique, there is a sort of correction implicit in
this turn. And as such it may serve as a remin-
der of something we all theoretically know:
that we ought not to view the œuvre, and the
work of deconstruction least of all, as the
magisterial unfolding of an essence, even
though we invoke some such essence whenever
we verify the later Derrida against the earlier
(Naas 20); or whenever we judge a text
worthy or unworthy of deconstruction. Decon-
struction ought never to be quite equal to
itself. This is, after all, the hope or chance of
Derrida’s wager with Geoff Bennington in
their collaborative Jacques Derrida (1991):
that J.D. might wriggle free from reduction
to the generative matrix of Djef’s “Derrida-
base” by saying something discrepant. The
drama, and indeed the comedy, of this lies in
the apprehension that deconstruction, pre-
cisely insofar as it opposes totalisation, must
itself struggle to avoid totalising. And it is in
the force field of this (comic) anxiety – over
deconstruction’s possible subsidence into a
set of predictable platitudes about the event,
errancy, and so forth – that sleepwalking
makes its turn in La contre-allée, from
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incipient gesture of mastery (over method) to
problem for deconstruction.
A couple of other topics that criss-cross this
late writing, and whose links with sleepwalking
I will trace, also relate to problems of totalising
and mastery. Firstly there is the question of the
animal, from “L’animal que donc je suis”
(1997) to the seminars on the beast and the
sovereign where Derrida is concerned, as
never before, to put in question the magisterial
gestures of his own seminar, even, and
especially, in the act of questioning mastery.
Then there is the scene of prize-giving that
takes centre stage in Fichus, where Derrida
must say yes to recognition as a master of the
critique of mastery, in the name of another.
Here the “je somnambule”modulates Derrida’s
effort to evade, without ingratitude, counter-
signing the countersignature of his mastery
that the prize risks being, so as to consign his
work to the chance, and the grace, of the
other and futurity. It is around these topoi,
and the intensification of the struggle with
mastery that they constitute – one might say,
the masterful effort to avoid mastering or
being mastered – that the “new” sleepwalking,
the one that announces itself in the first person,
crystallises. One might see in this the fruit of an
act of reflexivity, in the limited sense that
reflexion on a rhetoric has led to a reform
thereof. Beyond this, however, it is crucial to
note that what is at stake is not a self on
which one meditates, but rather resignation of
the self to an other that must be owned if it is
not to act in one’s place, and the nature of the
“I” that can write this. The “je somnambule”
takes the risk of owning and placing itself in
the most exposed position, on the way
towards a “you” that is – as we shall see, in
the formula “tu est tu” – “silenced.”
third-person somnambulism: the
security of a rhetoric
But before this, as I have said, sleepwalking in
Derrida was always, until quite late in the day,
the sleepwalking of the other, in the third
person. More than that, it was usually an
accusation – curt, summary, even a little
polemical – levelled at method or programme.
Thus, when Derrida tells us that Littré’s defi-
nition of “suppléer” respects “comme un som-
nambule” the strange logic of the verb it is
because the lexicographer’s very fidelity to
their material and methods has prevented
them from marking the strangeness of the
outcome (“Freud et la scène” 314). Something
similar applies to the “légèreté somnambuli-
que” of calling Molly Bloom’s monologue a
monologue (Derrida, Ulysse gramophone
109). Common-sense reason gives the critic
winged feet, but only insofar as they follow
the path of least resistance, straight past a ques-
tion, to the patent, reasonable, yet always pre-
mature conclusion. The editors of a selection
of Nietzsche’s uncollected fragments which
includes the enigmatic scribble, “I have forgot-
ten my umbrella,” fare even worse. Their expla-
natory note is “a monument of hermeneutic
somnambulism of which every word covers
with the most insouciant tranquillity an ant-
heap of critical questions” (Derrida, Éperons
104). Sleepwalking is thus an insensibility to
the questions that teem under the question at
hand.
Implicit in this usage is something like the
old theory according to which the sleepwalker
can only see objects insofar as they correspond
to the objects in their dream (see, e.g., Maine de
Biran). To the extent that a method or pro-
gramme has determined its objects and path
in advance, it has a propensity to plough on
regardless, with total confidence in its own
steps, but oblivious to problems or questions
that are beyond the scope of its plan, yet
which may for all that be encountered or engen-
dered in the going. This somnambulism is not,
thus, simply, axiomatically the contrary of vig-
ilance. The two may even go hand in hand, as
with the “sleepwalking, vigilant and automatic
interpreters” of Aristotle conjured in the
“Présentation” of Derrida’s Politiques de
l’amitié (434; i.e., the back sleeve). There
may, thus, be an automatic vigilance or vigilant
automatism that thrives in the similarly para-
doxical mode of busy sleep. Importantly, the
lexicographers, critics, editors, and interpreters
thomson
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accused of sleepwalking are not thereby
accused of laxity or carelessness. On the con-
trary, their very diligence has led them blithely
and efficiently past anything the itinerary had
not foreseen. The charge of sleepwalking con-
cerns not a simple lapse of attention, but a par-
ticular form, or tempo, of vigilance; one whose
investment, and assurance in its advance knowl-
edge of the route, is such as to forestall any
possibility of indecision; without which, as
Derrida has also suggested, decision is strictly
impossible (La bête II 79).
A corollary of this is that we should be wary of
any punctual moment that declares itself the
moment of vigilance par excellence, as in the
old and widespread European topos of crisis as
the “moment de réveil” (Derrida, L’Autre cap
34–35). To awaken, in this sense, would be to
realise at one fell swoop, and today, the chance
or the challenge to decide (κρίνειν) that consti-
tutes the κρίση. But if such a decisive moment
concentrates wakefulness, it also monopolises
it, thereby consigning all ensuing moments to
sleep, and unwittingly assuming the impossible
responsibility of watching over them in
advance. In this lies the problem of the “respon-
sibility as irresponsibility, of morality con-
founded with juridical calculation, of politics
organised into techno-science” (71). All
methods and programmes are, by their nature,
prone to this somnolence that consists of pro-
ceeding as if wakefulness had already been
taken care of. Even the best-intentioned initia-
tive in the world can do good only on the con-
dition that we do not fall asleep on the job (55;
“à la condition que notre attention ne s’y
endorme pas”). A further corollary of this is
that there is something somnolent about the
very moment of decision itself, insofar as it
acts as if it could abolish the need, and the possi-
bility, of any future decision. Thus, it would be
“court et sommeillant,” curt and dozy, to
respond to pressure to pronounce Nietzsche
either a proto-Nazi, or entirely guiltless of any
such thing (Derrida, Otobiographies 93). The
very posture of jumping to attention and decid-
ing, fully and finally, is already implicated in its
future sleep. The whole tendency of this form or
tempo of vigilance is thus towards sleep.
This characterisation of a whole tradition of
(urgent, decisionistic) vigilance as a busy
sleep is of no small importance to deconstruc-
tion. It is not just something deconstruction
sets out to avoid; in a sense, deconstruction is
its avoidance. This is why deconstruction
must be “slow and differentiated” so as to
allow us to take stock of “what happens”
along the way, to multiply “attention to differ-
ences,” and perhaps “refine the analysis in a
restructured field” (Derrida, La bête I 113–
14, 36). In other words, the new things we
notice may require us to redraw the map at
any moment, and we must be ready to notice
this too. This topic has a couple of curious cor-
ollaries. Firstly, the departure from the critical
tradition of vigilance demands a hyperbolic
inflation of vigilance: deconstructive attentive-
ness must aim to be impossibly prolonged and
differentiated. But, equally, it must also watch
over itself so as not to fall into a mere form of
wakefulness; which is to say, method. For the
rhetoric of slow and differentiated attention to
the discrepant irruption of the other cannot,
insofar as it is a rhetoric, be assured that it
too will not fall into a “dogmatic slumber”
(155). Deconstruction, if it is to be a thing,
must avoid the slide into a guaranteed, pre-
scripted set of moves that the practised decon-
structionist can invoke in their sleep, and at
which other deconstructionists can be counted
on to nod reassuringly. And, just because the
vigilance to which it aspires is strictly impos-
sible, the performance of deconstruction must
always be haunted by the possibility of its
own sleep.
In other words, deconstruction can never be
assured that it is always more vigilant than the
vigilance of method; or that method is always
something that sits, at a clear and distinct dis-
tance, over there. The problem with the accusa-
tion of sleepwalking, however, is that this is
precisely what it does say. Whoever points the
finger to say “they are asleep” says – immedi-
ately, implicitly – “I am awake.” And therein
lies the danger. For anyone can say this, at
any time, and even in their sleep. From this
would spring the sort of polemical bidding
war that, as Derrida suggests in D’un ton
derrida somnambule
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apocalyptique adopté naguère en philosophie
(1983), characterises the cultural prognostica-
tions of postmodernism, and into which decon-
struction must not slide (53). The accusation of
sleepwalking, however, opens onto precisely
this abyss, and it is a potential catastrophe for
a vigilance that would be alert to its own
sleep. Deconstruction, if it is to be deconstruc-
tion, must somehow negotiate this abyss, and
avoid coming to rest in a moment of specular
self-satisfaction. The curt othering of polemic
is, in this regard, a danger for deconstruction;
a moment of repose in which it is too clear
where things stand.
It would be wrong to suggest that the deploy-
ment of sleepwalking in the earlier Derrida
simply succumbs to the complacency of
polemic, or that there is never anything in the
accusation of sleepwalking to unsettle its own
assurance. There are also many places that
suggest a certain vigilance in sleep, though
these do not usually resolve into sleepwalking.
In “Force et signification,” Derrida suggests
that the “structuralist phenomenon,” as it
wanes, “will deserve” to fall into the hands of
the historian of ideas, on account of
everything in this phenomenon that is not
the question’s transparence for itself, every-
thing that, in the efficacity of a method, is a
matter of the infallibility ascribed to sleep-
walkers and which was once attributed to
the instinct of which it was said that it was
all the more sure for being blind. It is not
the least dignity of that human science
called history to concern by privilege, in
human actions and institutions, the
immense region of somnambulism, the
almost-everything that is not pure waking,
the sterile and silent acidity of the question
itself, the almost-nothing. (11)
The polemical moment of the passage is clear
enough. The structuralist phenomenon “will
deserve” the attentions of history in the sense
that it serves it right for sleepwalking. As for
the “dignity” of history – what it is worthy of,
what it deserves – it not only “concerns” but
depends upon somnambulism as the shadow-
agent of the typical acts that bequeath the
epoch as a congealed structure. This “privilege”
over sleepwalking is thus also the precise
respect in which history itself is structuralist,
and a sleepwalker. So it seems history and
structuralism will deserve each other.
But the polemical thrust of such a verdict is a
trap, insofar as it acts as if it could have done
with “structuralism.” For this “having done”
is, as Derrida reminds us, the structuralist
gesture par excellence, and it is not easily
avoided. Indeed, as Derrida also suggests in
another essay of the same time, it would be
easy to show that “a certain structuralism has
always been philosophy’s most spontaneous
gesture” (“‘Genèse et structure’” 237). Or, as
Derrida goes on to say in “Force et significa-
tion,” maybe consciousness just is structuralist
consciousness, insofar as it is consciousness of
things done, completed (12). So we cannot
simply have done with structuralism; nor even
with the finite, determinate, historical “struc-
turalist phenomenon.” For in it, Derrida says,
we were finally obliged to think structure “in
its concept.” And, as we live on its “fecundity,”
it is too early to bat away our dream: “il est trop
tôt pour fouetter notre rêve.” Rather, we must
think, from within the dream and in a manner
appropriate to dreams, what it could mean:
“Il faut songer en lui à ce qu’il pourrait signi-
fier” (11). The verb “songer á” serves Derrida
well here, spanning a range of senses from
musing or daydreaming to more purposeful
thinking, and leaving open the question of
what sort of thinking we can do in the dream
(en lui). Here, then, Derrida already proposes
the hesitation between philosophical rationality
and the qualified embrace of dream-thinking
for which, as we will see, he would praise
Adorno thirty years later.
And yet, crucially, Derrida does not (yet) call
this dream-thinking sleepwalking. Rather, that
term is still reserved for the merely unthinking
devotion to method. At the end of “Force et sig-
nification,” Derrida hands on the baton from
philosophy to Nietzsche’s gai saber (47). But
he does not embrace sleepwalking as Nietzsche
embraces it in The Gay Science, when he
awakens into the “consciousness that I am
dreaming and that I must go on dreaming lest
thomson
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I perish – as a somnambulist must go on dream-
ing lest he fall,” repositioning philosophy as
merely a means to “the continuation of the
dream” (116). Nor would he ever, any more
than he would replace the “abandonment that
is today the bad drunkenness of the most
nuanced structuralist formalism” with aban-
donment to the ecstatic lucidity of a putatively
good drunkenness (46).2 Derrida’s “vigilance”
would always, until the end, and even when it
is implicated in the dream, require us to sober
up, to be “dégrisée” (Fichus 51). Likewise it
would never be a question of replacing one som-
nambulism – benighted, automatic, mechanical
– with another sort that would be inspired,
clairvoyant. Indeed, Derrida’s sleepwalking
would never cease to be other, even when con-
jugated in the first person. Only it would radi-
cally lose its polemical potential for othering.
Before going on to consider the later turn, it
is perhaps worth noting that the polemical
potential of the accusation of sleepwalking
does not simply wane over time, and is if any-
thing most apparent in its final appearance:
that is, in the “légèreté somnambulique” that
Derrida attributes to Carl Schmitt in Politiques
de l’amitié (1994). As Schmitt parlays post-war
internment as a Nazi functionary into a spe-
cious scene of pseudo-Cartesian meditation,3
and finds salvation in the “Wisdom of the
Cell” (1948),4 there is absolutely no sense that
Derrida finds this anything other than
revolting.
Somnambulistic strength and lightness of
this progression. Prudence and security
[sûreté] of a rhetoric. The prisoner feels his
way in the darkness, from one corner of
the cell to the other. He risks a step, then
another and stops to meditate. (Derrida,
Politiques de l’amitié 187)
Schmitt, says Derrida, makes as if to face up to
his actions, but he never does, and never will.
His pantomime of groping in the darkness
“risks” nothing because it is choreographed
and underwritten by the “security of a rhetoric”
as comically and pathetically limited as the
scope of the cell. Sleepwalking here is, this
one last time, emphatically rejected, expelled
even, as a symptom of bad faith. This is not
to say that it will, when it next appears, have
changed its face entirely. But the gesture of
expulsion will have been, so to speak, expelled,
for constituting in itself, so it would appear,
“the security of a rhetoric.”
“moi sauf moi”: travelling with…
somnambulism
We can trace this turn to La contre-allée
(1999).5 In the first of his postcards to Cath-
erine Malabou (dated Istanbul, 10 May 1997),
worrying over the “Travelling with…” rubric
of the series in which the book will appear,
Derrida asks: am I sure I have ever even “trav-
elled with” me? With me “alive or awake,” or
“anything else but sleepwalking”?
To wake up it is not enough to open one’s
eyes. Sleepwalking, moreover, draws me
this morning as a seductive figure, she
[elle], to designate my experience of the
trance or transition called “travel.” I see
passing, very fast, the silhouette of the sleep-
walker [masculine], at the behest of a single
dream: to awaken at last, and that [cela] will
be, perhaps, perhaps not, hence the quaking
of my journeys, a nightmare. How can one
explain otherwise, otherwise than by that
apprehension of “perhaps,” the anguish of
a double desire, contradictory and simul-
taneous: to go back “home” as fast as pos-
sible, but to put off indefinitely the return?
I transport, on my travels, this sole obses-
sion: I can’t wait for it to end, alas! The ques-
tion, then, and this is what I wanted to get to,
will never have been that of “travel” but of
“travelling-with.” (Malabou and Derrida 13)
Sleepwalking here starts in the third person, as
a spectacle, but one that is becoming the phan-
tasm of an other that is mine, that haunts my
desire to travel; a dream that may only
awaken into a nightmare. Later in this first
missive, in the midst of a reminiscence of
meeting a sephardic community in Turkey,
Derrida casts himself as the “immobile
voyeur” who watches himself travelling, as if
to figure out the enigma of himself in
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the movement [or trip, or displacement:
déplacement] always “incognito” of a secret
that I transport without knowing it. Even
when I speak in front of crowds. I feel that
I transport (like an infant in the belly, I
hear his heart) but I don’t understand it at
all, this secret. Abroad perhaps someone
will tell me: revelation, bedazzlement, con-
version, I fall backwards, I am born, I die
in the moment of meeting, at the end of an
unknown alleyway, the messiah who will
come out of me where he has hidden for so
long. (Malabou and Derrida 21)
Travelling, then, as if in the hope that others,
strangers, will tell me who I am, what I am for,
becomes an ambivalent hunt, in which I am
hunter and hunted; as if there were someone I
wanted to help to escape from me (se sauver
de moi) by saving it in me (en le sauvant en
moi). Indeed, the “most economic formula”
for travelling-with would be “Moi sauf moi”:
me safe me, or me except for me (23).
The ontological high drama of this is,
however, almost systematically – and comi-
cally, in the manner of the postcard – undercut
by the “perhaps” of the earlier passage, and the
comedy of contingency. Hence the confession,
embarrassing for a quasi-messianic thinker,
that, before every journey, he is terrified some-
thing will happen:
I give the impression [J’ai l’air] of being for
the event, and of elaborating, as they say, a
thought of the event, of arrivance, of the
singular exposure to what is coming. You
know the refrain. (Malabou and Derrida 23)
But the joke is not just that the ardent propo-
nent of the event is terrified something will
happen. Worse even than the revenge of contin-
gency on the concept is the prescripted plati-
tude of “as they say” and “you know the
refrain.” The discourse of the event is already
humiliated in itself when it can become just
another tune on the conceptual karaoke. And
this points to another ambivalence, another
counter-alley, that threads its way through the
text, linking Derrida’s memories of his
father’s travails as a travelling salesman under
a paternalistic, patriarchal merchant house –
tasked or stained with the name “Tachet père
et fils” – with the pathos of being an interna-
tionally renowned philosopher, hawking his
wares round the conference circuit, mortified
by the adulation as much as the opprobrium.
He has, in short, a “mauvaise image” of the
whole business of his travels, including
the speeches through which one must con-
vince or seduce, this whole “academic
culture market” with which I have always
got along so poorly [fait si mauvais
ménage]. (Malabou and Derrida 39–40)
The scare quotes that distance Derrida from the
phrase “academic culture market” also impli-
cate him in it. For while they say, as Derrida
goes on to say, I am giving in a bit to a code,
I don’t entirely believe in what I’m saying (“je
cède un peu à un code, je ne crois pas tout à
fait à ce que je dis”), what is this giving-in-to-
a-code if not a surrender to the market? The
point becomes even clearer when he says,
rather sarcastically, “la ‘déconstruction,’ en
un mot, ce serait une certaine expérience du
voyage, n’est-ce pas” (40). It would be hard to
render exactly the conditional “serait,” and a
“n’est-ce pas” so deadpan it is not even a ques-
tion (or at least does not rate a question mark).
But the force of the phrase is: you all know the
one about “deconstruction” being a certain
experience of travel, don’t you. It anticipates,
in other words, a chummy connivance in the
very rhetoric that would announce the experi-
ence of the event as exposure to the absolutely
other, the absolutely unanticipated. We would,
of course, be foolish to think that deconstruc-
tion, any more than anything that can be repro-
duced as a rhetoric, is proof against
commodification. But here, at any rate,
Derrida tragicomically stages “deconstruction”
as a brand that follows him around, and that
goes out before him; that haunts him with a
“mauvaise image,” and prevents everything
that deconstruction would be.
This, then, would be deconstruction’s own
sleepwalking. This is not to say that it is some
other sleepwalking: it is still the becoming-com-
placent of a programme or method, but
now this problem emphatically regards
thomson
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deconstruction. It would certainly not be right
to say that Derrida had never before engaged
with deconstruction’s entanglement with
method.6 But the accusation of sleepwalking
had simplified this entanglement, functioning
rhetorically in such a way as to other method
and stabilise the relationship. Now, as all the
anti-sleepwalking gestures are themselves
expressly opened up to the suspicion of sleep-
walking, sleepwalking figures deconstruction’s
own other. Derrida casts himself as the host
of a sleepwalker, as the immobile observer of
an other not quite in his control who parades
the world in his place. Now, rather than
making the gesture of expulsion, he inoculates
himself with the sleepwalker.
It is also in this ambivalent guise that the
sleepwalker returns in the final postcard of La
contre-allée (Jérusalem, Tel-Aviv, Ramallah,
le 11 janvier 1998), regarding the question
“am I at Jerusalem?” first posed in a paper
delivered in Jerusalem in 1986.7 It is through
a “sleepwalking spectre” that both “millennia
of amnesiac love for each stone, each dead
person of Jerusalem,” and Derrida’s political
differences with the state of Israel, can
cohabit his “body” and rend the “I” of the
question (Malabou and Derrida 259). Sleep-
walking is thus the ambivalent mode of “geopo-
litical engagements” that might as well be
“alibis, ways of being elsewhere,” confounding
the ethic of errance “sans certitude et sans
assurance” with “la ponctualité du faux bond”
(259–61), which is to say unerringly letting
(someone) down, or standing them up. It is
thus in the name of a sort of clandestination/
destinerrance of political action that Derrida
takes on the mantle of the sleepwalker here.
So why, we might ask, does this turn come in
1999? Derrida dates his anxieties over travel to
his brush with prison in Prague in late 1981
(Malabou and Derrida 40). And he also tells
us in a footnote that Blanchot and Genet had
long been asking him why he had to make
such an exhibition of himself (25). Could it be
that the experience of being published by
high-end luggage-maker Louis Vuitton
brought the matter to a head? Perhaps. But
we might add that La contre-allée stands on a
sort of threshold with Derrida’s turn to the
animal, and to the questions of domination
that would dominate his final work. Indeed,
the second postcard of La contre-allée is
dated Cerisy-la-Salle 15 July 1997, the day
Derrida presented “L’animal que donc je
suis,” the paper in which he remarks that
asserting a total continuity between man and
beast “serait plus que somnambulique, […]
simplement trop bête” (L’animal 52). This is,
to some degree, a final fling for the “old” som-
nambulism, insofar as it warns against a sort of
precipitation towards a thesis (total continuity)
that Derrida will not finally underwrite. And
yet the “bête” (the “beast” that is by no
means merely “stupid”) with which it is con-
joined initiates a stealthy countermove, refus-
ing to secure the border of the human, and to
underwrite the entire dignity or sovereignty of
its “I,” or the “auto-biographic or auto-deictic
relation to self as ‘I’” (Derrida, L’animal 57).
Somnambulism here is already starting its
countermove, in the direction of La contre-
allée, and onto the ground on which beast
and sovereign are intricately entangled.
It is impossible to do justice to the intricacy
of the topology of the beast seminars. But one
has to start somewhere. At a certain point in
the sixth session of the second volume, after
an excursus on the faithful infidelity of
Celan’s “Die Welt ist fort / Ich muss dich
tragen” – an “I” that promises to carry “you”
in the absence of world – Derrida pulls up.
All this awakens us to a question that has not
stopped somnambulating [qui n’a pas cessé
de somnambuler] in our proceeding today.
The question: what is a phantasm?
(Derrida, La bête II 244)
The surprise here may be that the question of
the phantasm has ever been asleep. The word
“fantasme” has been active throughout this
seminar, and indeed preceding seminars. Nor
has it gone quite without definition. It has
been determined as a zone in which the impos-
sible may be named and apprehended. This
seminar has begun by invoking the “courage”
it takes to think “ça” (215) which, as well as
evoking the “Es” or “Id” of Freudian
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metapsychology, could stand for any “that,”
any object of thought. The “object” that
Derrida proceeds to explore, the possibility of
“the living-dead,” is profoundly phantasmatic,
dealing with something that cannot be loca-
lised, that cannot “avoir lieu,” or is in a place
without place; like the phantasm (according to
Freud), that belongs at once “qualitatively” to
the system perception-consciousness, and “fac-
tually” to the unconscious (218–20). As the
seminar goes on to explore the impossibility
of localising the dead person through the
choice between burial and cremation, the
entire field of the question comes to be invested
by the phantasm, derealising every “object”
even unto the “I” that would pose the question,
and pose as the subject of the question.
The seminar has promised it will end with
the question of the image and the imagination
(Derrida, La bête II 219). But when it does
end with the “bilden,” or capacity of image-
making, that, from Kant to Heidegger, defines
the Dasein, and the human exception (244–
46), the path that has led us here may seem
rather oblique and enigmatic. It supposes a
long tradition, stretching back to Aristotle,
for which the imagination or phantasia was cor-
poreal, and possibly the part of intelligence we
share with the beasts,8 as well as the instance
governing sleepwalking (see, e.g., Maine de
Biran, already cited). And it runs counter to
important twentieth-century efforts to hierarch-
ise (Husserl), or even to have done with (Sartre)
the imagination. Refusing to assert the sover-
eignty of (human) reason over (beastly) phanta-
sia, Derrida not only tracks the phantasm, but
flags the necessarily phantasmatic aspect of
the hunt. Hence his inquiry sleepwalks.
This is not, however, the only reason for the
somnambulance of the enquiry. When, at the
outset of the sixth seminar, Derrida determines
the phantasm as a name for the “impossible,”
he does so expressly “for methodological
reasons, that is to delimit the field that we are
going to explore” (La bête II 217). He per-
forms, thus, the very gesture of methodological
foreclosure of the question that he points to in
Heidegger’s seminars (151–52). Such a gesture
is also precisely what had always been accused
of sleepwalking. Only now it is countersigned
by Derrida’s text as something it cannot quite
avoid, or at least chooses not to avoid: the pre-
mature settling of the question “what is?” even
though, and precisely because, it is a question
that – spectacularly in the case of the phantasm
– cannot be answered in a way that would
satisfy “the logic of common sense that organ-
ises our lives” (220). Our relation to the ques-
tion of the phantasm must remain
phantasmatic because any claim to resolve the
double bind would entail a definition, which is
to say a phantasm of method. But equally, dis-
avowing method by placing somnambulism
over there would only be another way of
falling into the trap, reaffirming a secure
relation of subject to object at the very
moment in which it is said to tremble.
The seminars on the beast and the sovereign
are repeatedly, and from the start, concerned
not to swear off but to dramatise their own
mastery; the moment of mastery that is implicit
in even their most radical and destabilising
strategies. It is not just that the long, looping
arcs of exegesis are inevitably masterful
insofar as their ellipses and oblique strategies
are compelling. The alternative to methodologi-
cal definition – setting terms loose on us
without saying, or allowing us to ask, what
they mean, and leaving them to act without
question – entails its own methodological
mastery. Derrida stages this in the very first
seminar by invoking the opening of La Fon-
taine’s “Le loup et l’agneau,” which makes a
promise now that it will show presently that
might is always right: “La raison du plus fort
est toujours la meilleure: / Nous l’allons
montrer toute à l’heure” (La bête I 20 and
passim). The cunning of the verse, as Derrida
later explains, is to perform the right of the
stronger just by ostentatiously deferring its
explanation. But, just because he does explain
this later, Derrida’s exposition of La Fontaine
has also performed this deferral, advancing in
the meantime à pas de loup, and so participat-
ing, however playfully, in its peremptory vio-
lence. Derrida also explains this, citing his
“accredited position as a professor/teacher
authorised to speak ex cathedra for hours,” or
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weeks, or even years (La bête I 117). Such a
confession is as sheepish as it is wolfish; and
vice versa. That is, all the cunning or all the
simplicity it could muster could never undo
the mastery implicit in such a gesture; and
even the loose, looping, recursive structure of
the seminars, which try so hard to deny any
sense of a placidly unfolding logic, are also, in
their way, irreducibly allied to method and
mastery. Derrida may oppose, at a given
moment, a “slow and differentiated” decon-
struction to the “ex cathedra” pronouncements
that lay down the law of a seminar (La bête I
113–14). But the one does not go without the
other.
It is in this way also that, in the seventh
session of the second volume of the beast semi-
nars, Derrida’s effort to swear off “l’assurance
requise de la certitude indubitable” associated
with method and the Cogito appeals to the
somnambulatory.
As always, always, when I speak or when I
write, or doing the one and the other,
when I teach, as always, always, with each
step, with each word I sense or I fore-
sense, in the future anterior, the ungraspably
spectral figure of an event that could after
the fact, lending itself to reinterpretation,
re-stage, a stage still invisible and unforesee-
able for anyone at all, re-stage, thus, from
top to bottom, everything that will have
been – dictated, whispered to me, I mean
more or less consciously, or telepathically,
or somnambulatorily, intimated from
inside me or enjoined from very far
outside. (Derrida, La bête I 248)
More than a turning away from method, this is
an agonising extension of the terror and uncer-
tainty of its negative moment, its epoché, so
that every step is like the first step that has
not yet reached, and will never reach, the pla-
cidity and platitude of “je pense.”9 And this
is why any attempt at “je pense” disintegrates
into the convolutions of having the feeling
that I don’t yet feel, concluding, “Comme si
j’étais prévenu de ce que je ne vois pas venir.”
That is, roughly (sacrificing the echo of
“venir” in “prévenir”): “As if I were fore-
warned of that which I don’t see coming.” For
all the indeterminacy (“as if”) of all these feel-
ings of feelings, the most courageous sub-
mission to errancy does not go without the
hope of a certain surefootedness, or the
promise of a path, that is not entirely or
surely distinguishable from the “infallibility”
(or assurance or Sicherheit) conventionally
attributed, as Derrida says in “Force et signifi-
cation,” to the sleepwalker.
prizes, mastery, sovereign violence
Before turning back to Fichus, there is one
other topic we need to broach; that of the
award of prizes. Its links with mastery and
sovereignty may not be immediately apparent,
but they come to the fore in an unusually
polemical moment of the beast seminars,
where Derrida evinces a pronounced distaste
for Agamben’s sovereign rage to award
himself the prize for being the first to award
the prize.
Before this prizegiving for top of the class,
prizes for excellence and accessits, ceremony
[where] the priest always starts and finishes,
in a princely or sovereign fashion, by writing
himself into the top of the page […]
(Derrida, La bête I 138–39)
One may wonder how Derrida arrived at such
uncharacteristic exasperation. One could postu-
late a sort of subterranean tussle, between Force
de loi (1994), Foi et savoir (1996), and the first
Homo sacer (1995), over the reading of “bare
life” and the violent institution of sovereignty,
although, if there must be a question of pri-
ority, it would be hard to determine with any
certainty the order of the exchange. An Agam-
benian might point to the reference, in La
comunità che viene (1990), to our culture’s
“hypocritical dogma of the sacredness of bare
life” (68). But one might equally retort that
the paper “Force de loi” was first pronounced
in 1989, and “Prénom de Benjamin” in April
1990; and “Foi et savoir,” with its reference to
the “biozoologic (sacrificable),” in 1994
(Derrida, Foi et savoir 78). If one is to ask, on
the other hand, where this exchange takes an
expressly polemical turn, one might plausibly
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look to Agamben’s swipe, in the fourth chapter
of Homo sacer, at deconstruction as “an infinite
negotiation” with the gatekeeper of Kafka’s
“Before the Law” that risks leaving it (decon-
struction) in the role of gatekeeper (Homo
sacer 63). It is far from clear that Agamben
sees this very intervention as itself an act of
gatekeeping. But why, in any case, fall into
the abyss of ascribing priority, whether in
praise or in blame? Agamben’s penchant for
ascribing priorities is, once pointed out, hard
to unsee. And it is enough to make the critic
of power want to take no part whatsoever in
any scene of prize-giving. In any case, even if
Agamben does fall into self-congratulation in
a particularly crass way, the condition of possi-
bility for this fall is a mess of potential narcis-
sism in which it is hard to see a safe position.
What role sleepwalking might play in nego-
tiating this abyss is perhaps even less apparent.
In Genèses, généalogies, genres et le génie
(2003), it is a question of the “genius of
language,” though not as we usually think of
it (as a treasury of words and forms); but,
rather, a “quite other genius” that serves the
first by opening its eyes to “what turned up in
it, I mean the French language, as in sleep or
sleepwalking in the infinite dream of its uncon-
scious, finding and meeting itself there, without
ever having found itself there” (31–32). Here,
in Derrida’s tribute to the dream archive of
Hélène Cixous, the problem of awarding
prizes is more acute than ever. How should
one acknowledge the thanks owed to another
without falling into the gift economy of the
ego; without, that is, the award of a prize
immediately coming back to the self? For one
does sometimes feel thanks without debt,
guilt, or resentment, as Derrida says he feels
“every time that I find that she has found
before me what I believed I was the first to
have found” (77). But such “grace” is like the
dream that may be more awake than waking,
yet can only be written on awakening and by
having another speak in its place, whereby “Il
est tu” (51). That is, “he/it is silenced,” but
also “he/it is you.” Either way, the “I” is cir-
cumvented. For such consciousness as is
involved, call it “the literary consciousness,”
is radically not an affair of the “I” (54).
Indeed, the genius that is “tu” can be received
only on condition that one does not know one
receives it; and it is “more inappropriable
than anything of it that one can represent in
the consciousness” (88).
What is “tu” is thus like that “quite other
genius” of language that finds itself sleepwalk-
ing in the dreaming storehouse of language.
As such, sleepwalking is an agent of the “geni-
ality” that is, as Derrida says towards the end,
“neither a subject, nor an imaginary subject,
nor a subject of the law or of the symbolic,
[or] a possible subject, but what happens [ce
qui arrive]” (Genèses 91). It is also the con-
dition of this geniality that it “never appears
and is never said in the present,” as expressed
in the phrase “Tu est tu.” Our greatest thanks
is thus owed to a gift of sleepwalking that
cannot be appropriated by the “I,” and that is
best honoured in silence. Which is to say, con-
signed “to the future,” and “to others” (100).
Before Derrida got to this “tu” – with its dis-
placement of the “I,” its equivocal presence,
and its quasi-silence – he routed another
tribute, this time to Adorno, through another
equivocal pronoun: a “je somnambule.” The
phrase is doubtless a “conventional banality, a
politeness suitable to addressing the audience
on prize day,” to quote Derrida’s quotation of
Paul Celan’s acceptance speech for the 1960
Buchner Prize (La bête I 304). Pinch me, I
must be dreaming, says the modest winner,
with winning modesty. But, like Celan’s
phrase “in your presence” [in Ihrer Gegen-
wart], it is also linked to some of the most
pressing concerns of Derrida’s speech; most
obviously, the question of how philosophy
should respond to sleep and dreams. Can one,
he asks, speak of the dream without interrupt-
ing or “betraying” sleep? What Derrida
admires in Adorno is a double response that
hesitates between the curt “no” of philosophy,
and a “yes, perhaps, sometimes” that takes
the part of literature and the arts (Fichus 12–
14). This is Adorno’s “plus bel héritage,” to
have arraigned (fait comparaître) philosophy
before these, its “others” (16), and so to have
broached the “possibility of the impossible,”
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which can only be “dreamt,” and which dreams
of a thought that would be “sans souvraineté
indivisible” (19–21). Since a respect for
dreams, against the presumptive wakefulness
of the philosophical “I” and its claims to totalis-
ing self-presence and sovereignty, is at the heart
of Derrida’s thanks to Adorno, maybe it is only
right that a “je somnambule” should turn up,
on the next page, to acknowledge the debt.
Or rather to continue, rather sheepishly, to
prepare an acknowledgement that “I” have
not yet started. The sleepwalker’s first appear-
ance, eleven pages earlier, already articulated
a derealising modesty; an embarrassment
whose excessive presence produces spectrality.
In this very moment, addressing myself to
you, upright, eyes open, getting ready to
thank you from the bottom of my heart,
with the unheimlich or spectral gestures of
a sleepwalker, or even of a highwayman
coming to lay hands on a prize that was not
meant for him, everything would thus
happen as if I were in the middle of dream-
ing. (Derrida, Fichus 11)
This dreaming I is, indeed, seemingly almost
incapable of giving thanks. It is only “getting
ready” to do so, and will continue to do so
throughout the speech. Later we learn that
this getting-ready has been going on for
decades; decades in which voices from within
and from without asked: is it not finally time
to acknowledge, clearly and publicly, your
debt to Adorno (43)? And even then, when it
seems the moment has finally come, and
Derrida thanks his hosts for the opportunity
to give his thanks, he is still not fully ready.
I am happy today, thanks to you [grâce à
vous], to be able and to be obliged to say
“yes” to my debt towards Adorno, and on
more than one head, even if I am not yet
capable of responding to it, and of taking
responsibility for it [d’y répondre et d’en
répondre]. (44).
Beyond this bare “yes,” full-throated thanks
here and now, such as would allow him to
“decently measure my gratitude,” remains a
remote, past conditional: it is what “il
m’aurait fallu” so as to avoid “un double
échec”; a double failure of narcissistic indul-
gence on the one hand, and over-valuation or
overinterpretation of the event on the other
(44–45). What Derrida offers in the meantime
is the prospectus, at once grandiose and
summary, for “a book of which I dream to
interpret the history, the possibility and the
grace [grâce] of this prize.” The scope of the
seven chapter outlines that follow seems vast
(45–57). But since the writing of the book is
framed in the conditional, and identified as a
dream, this very scale only contributes to the
sense that it will never be written. Except,
that is, for the bits that had already been
written. For the seventh and final “chapter” –
on man’s mastery (Herrschaft) over animals,
and its implication in the “most powerful and
idealist tradition of philosophy” – largely re-
prises material presented in the 1997 paper
“L’animal que donc je suis” that would later
also be included in the book of the same
name (Derrida, L’animal 139–43). It is a
topic that had, at the time of the Frankfurt
address, a tremendous and immediate future
in the beast seminars. But there, in the semi-
nars, there is not a word on Adorno. So it
seems Derrida may already have said all he
had to say on this topic, despite the fact that
he deems it the “most decisive for readings of
Adorno to come.” Or perhaps for that very
reason. For, as he also says, these readings
“are already being written, I am sure of it”
(Derrida, Fichus 54–56). Such then is
“grace,” consigned to futurity and to others.
For all its modesty, however, this grace may
also risk appearing graceless or ungrateful.
When Derrida listens to his voices and says
“yes,” it is in spite of the “tormented” land-
scape of kinship and influence (Fichus 44).
And this may remind us of the torment
(Qual) of the source (Quelle) of which he had
written thirty years earlier in “Qual Quelle:
les sources de Valéry,” and make us wonder if
Adorno is not one of Derrida’s “aversions”;
an alien sovereignty from which he must steer
clear so as to avoid being engulfed. After all,
a prize for work “in the spirit of the Frankfurt
School” may seem to effect a sort of retroactive
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matriculation into that school (8). And if, as
Derrida suggests in Genèses, the geniality that
is “tu” remains “Without child, name, and heri-
tage, without school” (91), this is surely a ques-
tion that concerns ascendence as much as
descendence. Might acceptance of a prize in
the name of the master seem a sort of adoption?
And could the “je somnambule” that virtually
absents itself from this scene be, in part, a strat-
egy for defending his own geniality from this
takeover by a programme?
This ambivalence might explain Derrida’s
marked (and potentially graceless) preference
for speaking of Walter Benjamin, and perhaps
even for him, as if taking his part against
Adorno. The speech, after all, takes its title
and a text from a dream Benjamin recounts in
a letter to Gretel Adorno from a detention
camp in France in 1939, in which he says to
himself, in French, “Il s’agissait de changer
en fichu une poésie” (Derrida, Fichus 10–11);
that is, it was a matter of changing a poetry or
a poem into a “head-scarf.” Moreover, this
word “fichu,” taken colloquially and as an
adjective, veils Benjamin’s knowledge, a year
before his death, helpless and in the manner
of dreams – “le sachant sans le savoir,”
knowing without knowing it – that he was
“done for” (Fichus 36, 40–41). And this sense
of Benjamin’s helpless exposure to his own vul-
nerability marks a slender but decisive differ-
ence between him and Adorno that
punctuates Derrida’s speech. Thus, while we
cannot be sure that Adorno ever got over
(soit… revenu) his exile, Benjamin was the
one who simply never came back (revint) (21).
Absolutely done for, and no comebacks. Simi-
larly, Adorno may well have been, as Habermas
says, “without defence” – like a child, easy to
talk down, a stranger in the institutions he
inhabited – but he was still “less so” than Ben-
jamin (30). Benjamin wins, as it were, the prize
for defencelessness: an absolute defenceless-
ness, but equally an impossible prize, insofar
as the “winner” could never come back to
receive it.
This radical helplessness is not simply Derri-
da’s invention. In his essay “Charakteristik
Walter Benjamins,” Adorno suggests that the
“anti-subjectivism” that made Benjamin a
“supreme instrument of knowledge” also
entailed an unexampled openness to the play
of forces, terribly close to a sort of naivety or
vulnerability. Derrida does not cite this essay,
but one might see in it a belated instance of
what he calls Adorno’s “quasi-systematic”
desire “to shield” (soustraire… à) everything
“without defence” against violence, even the
violence of “traditional interpretation”
(Fichus 29). One might also see in it a certain
paternalism at which Derrida hints. For this
desire to remove from or take out of (soustraire
… à) harm’s way also involves, insofar as it
operates as if already at a remove, a sort of
paternal fantasy, albeit one that is strangely
grounded in what Adorno calls the Abgrund
or “abyss” of his own childhood; specifically,
in the tremendous sadness and impotence he
feels when he surprises himself one evening in
uttering a solecism drawn from the dialect of
his childhood (Derrida, Fichus 28). The sole-
cism, Derrida suggests, appears as such in the
context of Adorno’s advocacy of German – a
proper German, one that would be rooted in
the earliest childhood – as the elective language
of philosophy. His self-mortification is thus
ultimately symptomatic of the same “Jewish-
German psyche” (Fichus 26) that, in Force de
loi (1994), Derrida had linked with Benjamin,
and the notion that Zur Kritik Der Gewalt
(1921), his strange critique of violence, was
haunted in advance by the final solution
(Force de loi 67, 72–73). What distinguishes
Adorno’s impulse to defend from Benjamin’s
helplessly principled self-exposure to the
forces that would destroy him – what keeps it
at a remove – is thus a certain paternal violence
against the child of his own childhood, recuper-
ating a wound quasi-systematically imposed on
it by assuming the role of chastiser. This
“quasi-systematic” defence and the minor vio-
lence of rebuke are thus intimately entangled.
In Fichus, this fatal involvement and depend-
ency of defence and violence is played out
through a phantasmatic family in which Benja-
min would be, although the elder in years, the
son. Why, Derrida asks, does Benjamin
address his dream letter to Gretel and not to
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“Teddie”? And why was it also to Gretel that he
wrote, four years earlier, in response to Teddie’s
rather “authoritarian and paternal criticisms”
on, as it happens, the topic of dreams? Derrida
ostensively leaves these questions hanging; or,
as he says, asleep [en sommeil] (Fichus 37–38).
Doubtless, then, he is talking in his sleep
when, ten pages later, in parenthesis, he imagi-
nes a “confidential” letter he would write to
Gretel, on the subject of relations between
Teddie and Detlef (Benjamin’s pet name in
this family), asking why there is no prize in Ben-
jamin’s honour, and sharing with her his
“hypotheses on this subject” (46–47). Whatever
these hypotheses may be, Derrida leaves them in
the parenthesis of sleep. The tenor of his dream
is nevertheless apparent: in the mere gesture of
writing this letter, he writes himself into this
phantasmatic family, and takes the part of Ben-
jamin. That is to say, (of course, evidently) he
will speak on behalf of Benjamin; but also (phan-
tasmatically) he will assume the role of, or speak
from the place of the benjamin, or youngest son.
He can only, of course, take this place phantas-
matically, but he must do so if the defence of
the son is not to be a scene of adoption or kid-
napping; a contest between fathers over the
right to dominate.
The place awarded to Benjamin in Fichus –
as a silent witness to an absolute defenceless-
ness that cannot speak for itself – is itself at
once impossible and necessary. There must
be this grace that moves outwith the narcissis-
tic economy of the ego. Yet to name it is
already to award a prize, and so to betray it
by drawing it into the orbit of that very
economy. One manner of awarding this prize
would be that of Hannah Arendt’s famous
profile, in which Benjamin was like “a sleep-
walker […] invariably guided […] to the
very centre of a misfortune” (Arendt 13).
Arendt invokes here an unhappy version of
the somnambule Sicherheit that, in her
native German, traditionally keeps the sleep-
walker safe. Unhappy, that is, for Benjamin.
For his misfortune is our great good
fortune. As Arendt’s sleepwalker, he is help-
lessly ethical; that is, without defence
against even his own ethos. It is a condition
no one could, by definition, wish upon them-
selves, and that nobody would want, but that
everyone concerned with justice wants a piece
of. In its most placidly commonsensical
instances, the discourse of justice entails this
impossibility. One way round this is the
pathos of Arendt’s sleepwalker: maintaining,
at a safe distance, as a spectacle to be
admired and pitied, an exemplary figure that
is absolutely debarred from regarding itself,
and that cannot decide its path (consciously,
in the form of a decision) precisely because
it is (systematically, in the totality of its
being) determined towards a certain step.
Derrida’s justice always wagered on rhetorics
– of errancy, path-breaking, attentiveness to
the irruption of the quite other, the to-
come, and the monstrous – that implied a
high level of risk, such that they could not,
for the life of them, stand at a distance spec-
tating. This nevertheless seemed to place
them at a distance from another phantasm,
that of the somnambule Sicherheit of the
already-beaten path of method. But then, at
a certain point, it seems there is a risk for
the very rhetoric of risk that it may, precisely
by avoiding this risk of sleepwalking, subside
into platitude. The risk of this sleepwalking
would be not just that it is not assured by
either the absolute assurance and justice of
an idiomatic step, or the absolute assurance
and justice of a preordained path, but that
it is not assured of falling into either.
Indeed, deconstruction had always been the
hope, without assurance, and only without
assurance, of a step that would be adjusted
to a certain path. Setting out, as disarmed
as possible, with every fibre attuned to what
is to come, hoping that none
of this is merely “the security
of a rhetoric,” but painfully
conscious that there can be no
assurance that it is not, “je
somnambule.”
disclosure statement





1 “De l’économie restreinte” 369–70.
2 Derrida nods here to the notion, usually attrib-
uted to Saint Ambrose (of Milan), of a bona ebrietas
that exalts the soul with joy, but without the
attendant confusion and tottering.
3 Derrida’s relationship with the epoché of Des-
cartes’s withdrawal into his poêle is, to say the
least, complicated. See, e.g., his comments on
the “courage” it takes to think “ça” (La bête II
215), to which I will turn presently. But also note
how, in what follows, Freud’s “abyssal daring”
and courageous advance into contradiction conju-
gate with the feint of “splendid isolation” (La bête II
220, 224, 230); and compare with Derrida’s
account of his own period of retreat from 1963
to 1968 in “Ponctuations: le temps de la thèse.”
4 Schmitt’s essay “Weisheit der Zelle” was first
published in 1948 in Ex Captivitate Salus.
5 It is important to note in passing, because there
is not space to go into it in detail, that this book,
like the collaboration with Geoff Bennington
already cited, takes the form of a double wager,
according to which Catherine Malabou tracks
the “écart” or “catastrophe” between “arriver et
dériver” since “Derrida est passé” (11), and
Derrida must attempt to wriggle free in the
mode of the postcard.
6 I explore this in my article, “Jeux d’écarts: Der-
rida’s Descartes.”
7 This refers back to Malabou’s citation (122)
from “Comment ne pas parler,” in Psyché: Inven-
tions de l’autre (Paris: Galilée, 1987).
8 Montaigne’s efforts, in his “Apologie de
Raimond Sebond,” to demote human reason and
elevate animal intelligence, stress the imagination.
For Gassendi too, the beasts manifestly have
some sort of intelligence, albeit one that works
through the Phantasia – “sufficiat videri satis man-
ifestum, esse speciem quandam rationis in Brutis,
ac ipsorum Phantasiam suo quodam modo ratioci-
nari” (413) – but he draws the line at the faculty of
attention (419).
9 With regard to the production of heterodox
Cogitos, I explore the importance of Paul Valéry
as one of Derrida’s “re-pères” in my article
“Jeux d’écarts: Derrida’s Descartes,” cited above.
Another re-père in this regard would be Blanchot.
In addition to numerous references to Blanchot in
the beast seminars – including the notion, cited
from L’écriture du désastre, of the unconscious as
“la veille dans sa vigilance non éveillée” (Derrida,
La bête II 258) – see the motto “Je rêve, donc
cela s’écrit” in Blanchot’s extraordinarily sugges-
tive 1962 essay “Rêver, écrire,” in L’Amitié 165.
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